This paper empirically tests the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis with a narrative measure of tax shocks. The present value, at the time of legislation, of tax increases motivated solely by concerns for improving the scal health of the government is used for the tests. These tax news represent a switch from debt to tax nancing that should have no eects on the economy if Ricardian equivalence holds as a good approximation. For the post-1980:IV period, I nd evidence for scal anticipation as many of the tax increases are implemented with substantial delays and distortionary taxes increase economic activity before taxes go up, which is caused by intertemporal substitution. Therefore, Ricardian equivalence is rejected.
Introduction
The recent global nancial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crises in Europe have put scal policy center stage. An important benchmark for scal policy is the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. It states that it does not matter for the economy whether government expenditures are nanced by current taxation or instead by issuing government bonds (Barro, 1974) . Ricardian households are only concerned about the present value of their intertemporal tax liabilities, which are in turn determined by the present value of the stream of government expenditures and currently outstanding government debt. The timing of taxes does not matter.
Government bonds are simply seen as postponed taxes that will have to be paid at some future date. Hence, a switch from tax to bond nancing, or vice vera, has no eect on macroeconomic variables. Barro (1974) argued that Ricardian consumers react, as long as the stream of government spending is kept xed, to an increase in the government decit by increasing savings by an equal amount. The tax cut leads to a dollar-for-dollar increase in bond holdings. Therefore, neither output nor interest rates change. The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is based on several restrictive assumptions, such as lump-sum taxes, perfect capital markets where forward-looking households do not face liquidity constraints and can borrow at the same interest rate as the government, altruistic operative bequests that link generations, and no uncertainty about the future tax incidence.
A large number of theoretical and empirical papers have studied Ricardian equivalence. This literature has been surveyed by Seater (1993) and more recently by Ricciuti (2003) . On a theoretical level, relaxing the very strict assumptions necessary for Ricardian equivalence can lead to government bonds having either positive or negative net wealth eects for households, as argued by Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1989 , instead of government bonds not being considered net wealth under Ricardian equivalence.
For example, Judd (1987) demonstrated this in a theoretical model with distortionary taxes, nite lives, and adjustment costs. Wealth eects can cancel each other or be altogether negligible. Therefore, the fact that tax systems are generally not based on lump-sum taxation does not invalidate Ricardian equivalence, as, for example, transportation costs do not invalidate the assumption of perfect competition in many applications. The issue cannot be settled on theoretical grounds. An answer to whether Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation to reality has to come from empirical studies.
1 This means that the issue of how good of an approximation
Ricardian equivalence is cannot be determine based on theory and empirical tests are called for. However, the two surveys show that the empirical evidence is not conclusive.
The rst goal of this paper is to shed new light on the controversial issue of whether the economy displays Ricardian equivalence features, which is of great relevance in particular to orienting theoretical models and for understanding some of the eects (associated with tax increases) of scal consolidation, a timely topic. I suggest a new test of Ricardian equivalence that relies on a narrative measure for a surprise switch from bond nancing to taxation. Such a switch should have no eects on real GDP and interest rates if Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation. A current increase in taxes that reduces outstanding bonds implies an osetting reduction in future taxes. I use for this purpose the present value of discretionary changes in tax revenue that were motivate by concerns about the inherited government budget decit and were introduced for reasons unrelated to current macroeconomic uctuations or government spending. Various narrative tax measures have been constructed for U.S. scal policy by Romer and Romer (2010 Evans (1991) . Furthermore, Evans et al. (2012) recently showed that rational expectations are not necessary for Ricardian equivalence to hold and a certain adaptive learning rule instead can produce equivalence.
2 They have been used by several others, such as Favero and Giavazzi (2012) , and references that they provided. Furthermore, the narrative approach was also used by, among others, Ramey (2011) to study instead the eects of large U.S. military build-ups.
3 A closely related study, using Romer and Romer's methodology, was presented by Cloyne (2013) for the United Kingdom. However, the United Kingdom has no precedents of "scal consolidations,"
The second goal of the paper is to check whether the results of Romer and Romer (2010) are robust to using a subcategory of their data set that they did not consider in separation: the present value of decit-driven legislated tax changes. A subcategory of their aggregated exogenous tax shocks may or may not behave differently from the aggregated. Romer and Romer (2010) calculated a cumulative tax multiplier of close to -3, so that a tax revenue decreases of 1% of GDP leads to an increase in GDP of close to 3%.
Section 2 describes aspects of the data relevant for my study and Section 3 presents results for the full post-WWII sample and for two sub-samples, one prior to and the other post 1980:IV. Once I account for a structural break in 1980:IV, the prior sample has too few observations to allow reliable inference. But the post-1980:IV sample delivers empirical results that show that decit-driven tax increases have statically signicant and positive eects on economic growth during the implementation-lag period, before the announced tax increases take eect. Ricardian equivalence is therefore not supported by the data. Moreover, I nd support for scal anticipation, contrary to Romer and Romer (2010) . The subcategory that I consider therefore behave very dierently. The conclusion discusses further implication of my ndings.
2. Exogenous Tax News Motivated by Decit Reduction: The Data Romer and Romer (2010) constructed in their seminal paper two "news" series for discretionary tax changes that are unrelated to the business cycle. One is for tax changes motivated by concerns about long-run economic growth. The other is for tax changes motivated by concerns about the government budget decit that are also unrelated to the current business cycle. For each of the two series they construct two measures: one recording the amount of the tax change relative to GDP when it takes eect; the other recording the present value of the tax change when it is legislated, again as a ratio to GDP. The three-year Treasury bond rate is used for discounting dealing with inherited budget decits that are unrelated to the business cycle, as would be necessary for testing Ricardian equivalence. future tax revenue changes to the time when a measure was passed into law. Leeper et al. (2008) referred to this as scal foresight or anticipation. In this case, the model needs to account for both the date when the tax change is announced (legislated) and the dates when it is implemented.
When Ricardian equivalence holds, households incorporate the intertemporal government budget constraint into their permanent income. The tax news measure relevant to them is the present value of Romer and Romer's (2010) decit-driven tax changes. This measure is constructed is such a way that it is orthogonal to all other information available in a given period. 6 It is therefore ideally suited for testing Ricardian equivalence. At the time when the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shocks are announced (not when they are implemented), there are no associated changes to government spending announced, so that there are no government spending shocks at that time that are associated with the specic tax news. 7 This is exactly the scenario needed for testing the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, i.e., keeping the expected stream of government spending xed when a tax news shock hits.
Would Romer and Romer's (2010) tax cuts motivated by concerns about longrun growth be suitable for testing Ricardian equivalence? The long-run tax-change variables were constructed so that they are orthogonal to the current business cycle and current government spending. However, the stated intention of these tax shocks was explicitly to either decrease the size of the government (e.g., the 1981 Reagan tax cuts) or to spur productivity growth and increase eciency. This subcomponent of tax changes, which stimulates long-run growth, is therefore not valid for testing Ricardian equivalence because there are associated changes in future government spending or in future income that both aect permanent income. In order to illustrate the Ricardian case, it is useful to look at a simplied version of the intertemporal government budget constraint (see, e.g., Hakkio and Rush, 1991, and Haug, 1996) :
where RE t is real tax revenue in period t, including revenue from monetizing decits by printing money (which is treated as an ination tax). B t denotes real government debt, r is the real interest rate, and GE t stands for real government expenditures on purchases of goods and services plus transfer payments. It is assumed that the government does not follow a Ponzi scheme so that intertemporal government budget balance holds and the limit term in the above equation goes to zero.
Ricardian households do not change their consumption and savings plans as long as the present discounted value of expected future tax revenues, which is equal to current bonds and expected future government spending, does not change. The future path of government debt is irrelevant because all debt has to be ultimately nanced by taxes. The above decit-driven tax news t this scenario under our null hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence, because the tax increases are explicitly targeting a reduction in inherited decits and therefore lead to less national debt. Less national monetary policy variables. 8 It is straightforward to dene this intertemporal government budget constraint instead in terms of ratios to GDP to illustrate the eects (see, e.g., Hakkio and Rush, 1991) . debt means an osetting reduction (in present value terms) in implied future taxes.
Hence, a decit reduction now is a switch from future to current taxation, while the stream of government spending is expressly kept xed. In other words, the two dierent time paths of taxes (before and after the decit-driven tax news) have the same present discounted values under the null hypothesis. Regressions were carried out with the software WinRATS, version 6.35, based on the original code of Romer and Romer (2010) , except for the CUSUM of squares tests that were done in EViews, version 8.1. In order to check the accuracy of the code, regressions were repeated with EViews. Further, I replicated the main regressions in Romer and Romer (2010) with EViews and got the same results.
Ricardian Equivalence Test Results: OLS and VAR

Full Sample Period: OLS Without and With Controls for Output Growth
The rst step in the analysis of Romer and Romer (2010, equation (6) , p. 780) is to study the eect of an exogenous tax change on real output growth. Instead of using total exogenous tax changes, I select the present value of decit-driven tax changes only:
where ∆Y t is the log change (growth rate) of real GDP, ∆T t is the present value of the stream of tax changes legislated at time t, and ε t is a mean-zero Gaussian error that is orthogonal to all ∆T t−i by construction of the narrative tax changes. The sum j i=0 β i measures the cumulative scal multiplier from period 0 to period j. The permanent income hypothesis predicts for tax increases a negative effect on consumption as expected after-tax real income falls and government bonds are treated as net wealth under Ricardian non-equivalence so that overall household wealth falls. This causes additional dynamics that lower real GDP so that β i < 0 for some or all i. On the other hand, intertemporal substitution predicts, in the presence of distortionary taxes and Ricardian non-equivalence, an increase in consumption (or investment, depending on the type of tax used) before the implementation of a tax increase (assuming there is a delay; hence β i > 0 for periods i till the implementation date) and a decrease after the tax takes eect (with β i < 0 for periods i after the implementation date). In contrast, Ricardian equivalence predicts that the effects on real GDP from such a decit-driven tax increase should not be statistically signicantly dierent from zero (all β i = 0). Figure 2 presents the cumulative eect of a 1% of GDP increase in decitdriven tax revenue (solid line) on real GDP, estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). The eect on real GDP is negative in the rst period and positive thereafter, reaching a peak of 1.98% ve periods after the tax shock and then declining. Are the eects of decit driven tax increases statistically signicantly dierent from zero?
The answer depends on the width of the condence bands used in Figure 2 . The usual two standard-error condence band, which is for normally distributed coecient estimates approximately a 95% condence band, indicates no statistical signicance at any horizon in Figure 2 . Using instead the one standard-error condence band, which is equivalent to an approximate 68% condence band, gives a dierent picture. Now, the responses of real GDP are statistically signicantly dierent from zero at horizons three to eight after the tax shock. However, in contrast to Romer and
Romer's results with all exogenous tax shocks, the responses are positive so that the tax increase causes an increase in real GDP at these horizons.
The next step in Romer and Romer (2010) is to include in equation (1) the lags of GDP growth:
The lags of output growth control for the dynamics of GDP and a "multitude of other inuences" (Romer and Romer, 2010, p. 781) . Figure 3 reports the eects of a 1%
of GDP increase in decit-driven taxes on real GDP when lagged output growth is controlled for in the regression. Overall the eects are similar in magnitude to those without controls, though the peak eect is lower. The two and one standard-error condence bands are calculated from bootstraps with 10,000 replications. The eect in the rst period is again negative but remains statistically insignicant for the 95% condence band. The 68% condence band indicates statistical signicance at the rst horizon, although just barely so. The only other horizon where there is possibly statistical signicance is the fourth one, but again it is very much a borderline case.
Romer and Romer (2010) report 68% condence bands. However, Ramey (2011, footnote 11, p. 11) pointed out that there is "no formal justication" provided in the literature for using 68% condence bands instead of the usual 95% bands.
Furthermore, it is neither justied on theoretical grounds to use 68% bands.
The empirical evidence over the full sample period would seem to favor the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. This is because tax increases, intended to reduce inherited budget decits, have no statistically signicant eects on real output at usual condence levels, unlike Romer and Romer's results for using all exogenous tax shocks. But, the crucial question is whether the regressions in equations (1) and (2) are structurally stable over the sample period.
The cumulative sum (CUSUM) of squares test is based on squared recursive residuals that are calculated from sequentially increasing samples, starting with the rst thirteen observations in our case up to the full sample size. This test was proposed by Brown et al. (1975) . An alternative model specication to single equations is a VAR. The threevariable VAR consists of the narrative decit-driven present value of the tax shock as a percent of GDP, the log of real GDP and the three-month Treasury bill rate in percent. Following Romer and Romer (2010) , I use 12 lags on each variable and order them for a Cholesky decomposition with the tax shock rst, followed by real GDP and then the Treasury bill rate last. This ordering allows for tax changes to aect output contemporaneously but output shocks and interest rate shocks have no contemporaneous, i.e., within the same quarter, eects on tax changes. The interest rate responds contemporaneously to all shocks. There are no restrictions on lagged responses of variables to shocks. The appeal of the VAR approach is that it allows for rich endogenous dynamics that follow unexpected scal policy changes. that are known in period t to be implemented in a future period t+i. I run separate regressions for unanticipated and anticipated decit-driven tax changes. Figure 7a reports the cumulative multipliers for an unanticipated decit-driven tax shock in the post 1980:IV period. As one would expect based on standard theory, the eects on real GDP are negative at all horizons. The largest negative eect occurs in the third quarter after the impact and the multiplier reaches a value of -1.67, however, all multiplier estimates are insignicant at the usual 5% level. This value is about half the size of the value calculated by Romer and Romer (2010) .
However, estimates are too imprecise to draw further conclusions on the size of the tax multiplier when tax shocks are unanticipated. This is due to having only ve observations on these types of tax shocks. shows positive cumulative multipliers from three quarter onwards and the multipliers are statistically signicantly dierent from zero in quarters ve to twelve after the impact. 9 The cumulative multiplier reaches a maximum value of 2.53 in quarter ten.
The estimates are relatively precise, given that I have a sample with 12 observations on anticipated tax shocks in the post-1980:IV period. These results are consistent with intertemporal substitution due to scal anticipation or foresight as argued by Leeper et al. (2008) . Furthermore, Ricardian equivalence is hence not supported by data using the narrative record on tax changes.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on scal policy by using a part of a narrative measures developed by Romer and Romer (2010) data set. Ricardian equivalence may be a good approximation to reality and the fact that taxes are generally not lump-sum does not necessarily invalidate it (Judd, 1987) .
I use the present-values of the decit-driven sub-category of Romer and Romer's (2010) period is predicted by the theory of scal anticipation of Leeper et al. (2008) . Intertemporal substitution leads to a scal stimulus ahead of the implementation date for a tax increase but it comes at the expense of lower economic activity afterwards.
In other words, there is no free lunch, as the scal stimulus ahead of the implementation is followed by lower economic activity after the tax increases take hold.
These results are dierent from those of Romer and Romer (2010) , who added in tax changes motivated by concerns over long-run economic growth. Also, these results are relevant for some aspects of scal consolidation policies, and for tax cuts but with opposite eects. Assessing the negative quantitative eects after the implementation of anticipated taxes is not a trivial task that I leave for future research. FIGURE 2. Estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1% of GDP on GDP, as in equation (1) FIGURE 3. Estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1% of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) 2 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 CUSUM of squares 5% significance FIGURE 4a. Structural change test of the GDP growth regression with no controls as in equation (1) FIGURE 5a. Prior-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) FIGURE 5b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) FIGURE 7b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an anticipated exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, with one and two standard-error confidence bands (bootstrapped)
